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could be more effectively organized and carried out in the future.The
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oversaw these projects, and two focus group meetings that brought
together a total of forty practitioners.
In this article, we seek to better understand two issues: (1) how
track two initiatives have changed in scope, organization, and intent;
and (2) how track two practitioners have sought to disseminate their
work beyond the participants of those initiatives. Our findings present
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identify a number of trends and common types of practice.
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Among the trends we have identified are the following: during the
peace process years, more track two initiatives were undertaken with
elite/professional participants than with representatives of the grass-
roots, but in the subsequent decade-and-a-half, Israeli–Palestinian
grassroots, track two initiatives gradually replaced senior-level track
two exchanges; most of the grassroots initiatives we studied were
relationship focused, whereas those involving elite participants are
outcome focused; the track two community subscribes to a set of
theoretical propositions about which conditions and contexts facilitate
the transmission of track two insights and ideas to the political
process, but these propositions have yet to be validated; and track two
specialists do little strategic planning about ways to most effectively
transfer track two insights and ideas to the political process. Our
research also identified four distinct, but not mutually exclusive,
approaches to practice: the psychological, the constructivist, the capac-
ity building, and the realistic interest.
Key words: conflict resolution, negotiation, track two diplo-
macy, Israeli–Palestinian peace process, reflective practice,
theories of conflict transformation.
Introduction
In the years following the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993, the second Inti-
fada, and the subsequent breakdown of the Israeli–Palestinian peace
process, much has been written about “what went wrong” and how
meaningful peace between Israelis and Palestinians can be reestablished
(see e.g., Hanieh 2001; Pundak 2001; Slater 2001). Much of this analysis
has focused on weaknesses within the official peace-making process,
which is indeed where the main responsibility for failure rests. But there
is little agreement among analysts, especially among Israeli and Palestinian
ones, with regard to the specific reason for failure in the negotiation
process. Explanations include an anthology of reasons, such as the lack of
commitment of key political stakeholders to the map agreed on during
the Oslo process, the lack of mechanisms to effectively implement the
peace agreements, the inability of the leaders to deal with their hard-line
constituencies, the lack of preparation on the part of the negotiation
teams, the shortcomings of the mediation process designed by the United
States, poor timing, and a failure to address the structural conditions that
sustain the conflict. A significant amount of literature reflects specifically
on the negotiation process and its failure (e.g., Savir 1998; Enderlin 2003;
Beilin 2004; Ross 2004; Qurie 2006; Miller 2008).
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While recognizing the central role that official peace making played in
the failure of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, this article focuses on a
more neglected area of investigation: track two diplomacy. We seek to
examine how track two processes were designed and implemented, and to
better understand what worked, what did not, and how new initiatives
could be more effectively organized and carried out in the future. Although
numerous track two initiatives involving Israelis and Palestinians have been
undertaken since the early 1990s, few authors have reflected on these
unofficial efforts and how they affected the larger peace process. Moreover,
much of the writing on this subject focuses on individual track two initia-
tives and hardly looks at them comparatively or as pieces of a whole.
In 2005 and 2006, we joined together with two other colleagues to
conduct a research project to examine second track diplomatic activities
involving Israelis and Palestinians between 1992 and 2004. This was a
particularly fruitful time for second track activities as it coincided with the
lead-up to the Oslo peace process, and the subsequent efforts to sustain
that initiative after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the outbreak of the
second Intifada, and the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit. Our
research included a series of interviews with well-known practitioners who
were active in Israeli–Palestinian peacebuilding initiatives, and culminated
with two workshops that brought together a cross-section of these indi-
viduals, one in Istanbul and the other in Washington, DC. Throughout, we
have sought to better understand two issues: (1) how second track initia-
tives have changed in scope,organization,and intent; and (2) how track two
practitioners have sought to disseminate the results of their work beyond
the participants of the initiative such that they have a broader impact on
peacebuilding. This article reports on our findings.
Track Two Diplomacy
Track two diplomacy1 (Montville 2006) and interactive conflict resolution
(ICR) workshops (Fisher 1997) have emerged in the last several decades as
a complementary method to official state-based diplomacy, particularly
when intractable identity-based conflicts have proven resistant to formal
peace-making efforts. Often defined as interventions in which influential
representatives from communities in conflict are brought together by an
unofficial third party to consider the underlying roots of the conflict and
means for its positive transformation (Davies and Kaufman 2002), track two
provides a pathway for off-the-record and sustained contact between
representatives of adversary groups even when official diplomacy proves
impossible. Unlike official diplomacy, track two diplomacy begins with an
assumption that protracted social conflicts cannot be resolved without
paying attention to the intersocietal dimensions and social identity needs of
the conflicting parties, or in Harold Saunders’s terms only with a “multi-
level peace process” (Çuhadar 2010: 574).
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An essential aspect of the track two diplomacy/problem-solving work-
shop approach is that the parties need to go beyond the zero-sum thinking
that shapes their view of the conflict, to reframe the conflict as a “mutually
shared problem” in which they work “together” toward finding a mutually
acceptable solution (Mitchell 2003). The early pioneers of the method, such
as John Burton (1969), Leonard Doob (1974), Herbert Kelman (1977), and
Vamik Volkan, Demetrios Julius, and Joseph Montville (1991), argued that
these workshops need to be interactive, and that the underlying psycho-
logical and social dynamics of intergroup conflict, such as victimization and
dehumanization, should be understood, and the basic human and psycho-
logical needs of these groups should be addressed.
Advocates of track two work claim that it can have many positive
benefits to peace processes, including providing a safe, off-the-record, and
sustained venue for dialogue among adversary groups; engaging adversaries
in dialogue when official peace processes fail or are not possible; testing
out proposals for conflict management prior to the initiation of formal
mediation or diplomacy; and empowering citizens as participants in peace
processes. Indeed, Ronald Fisher (2006) and Susan Allen Nan (1999) have
shown that track two diplomacy is most useful as a prenegotiation strategy.
Track two initiatives vary considerably in terms of their structure,
content, methodology, and goals. Esra Çuhadar (2009) has categorized track
two activities along two dimensions: the type of people who are brought
together for interaction, and the stage at which the conflict is being waged.
The first dimension, type of participants, includes political leaders who
interact unofficially (also known as track one-and-a-half diplomacy; see Nan
2005),influential elites who do not hold official positions (such as newspaper
editors, academics, leaders of civil society groups), or people representing
the grassroots sector (such as students). The second dimension categorizes
track two activities according to the stage of the conflict they take place in:
preventive, prenegotiation, negotiation, and postagreement peacebuilding.
Another useful distinction in understanding different forms of track
two diplomacy is to distinguish between outcome-focused initiatives
(initiatives designed to generate ideas for political agreements that can be
adopted by official diplomats) and process-focused initiatives (initiatives
that are designed to build relationships, trust, and mutual understanding
among adversaries at both the elite and grassroots level to prepare the
groundwork for peace to take hold). Both approaches have been widely
used in track two circles, either separately or in combination. For example,
the now famous Pugwash meetings focused on elite-to-elite exchange by
bringing together Soviet and American scientists and military and civilian
analysts at the height of the Cold War to consider specific initiatives that
could facilitate bilateral cooperation on nuclear issues and reduce the
likelihood of an outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and the United
States. Another eminent example of elite-to-elite track two exchange was
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the Geneva Initiative between the Israeli and Palestinian elite under the
leadership of former Israeli Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Yossi Beilin. By
contrast, Seeds of Peace is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that
often seeks to help build relationships at the grassroots level. Among its
projects is an international summer camp that brings together young
people from across various conflict sectors in order to promote coexist-
ence and reconciliation. Although the first two initiatives focused on high-
level technical discussions and the other on changing the way that
individuals, often children, understand each other, we consider both to be
track two initiatives in this study.
Track Two and Oslo
In this research, we focus on track two initiatives carried out in the Israeli–
Palestinian context between 1992 and 2004. Perhaps no contemporary
conflict has received more attention by practitioners of track two diplo-
macy than the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Since the 1980s, track two initia-
tives have brought together hundreds of Israelis and Palestinians from a
variety of sectors. Participants in track two initiatives have included, among
others, officials acting in an unofficial capacity, youth groups, academic
researchers, teachers, journalists, bureaucrats, artists, health-care practitio-
ners, environmentalists, and business groups. Some of these efforts have
focused specifically on communication and relationship building, while
others have engaged the parties in discussions of specific issues, such as the
management of water resources, the political future of Jerusalem, the right
of return, and curriculum reform (Kaufman, Salem, and Verhoeven 2006).
Some of the early meetings were arranged by international scholar
practitioners, such as Herbert Kelman of Harvard University, who started
bringing together people close to Israeli decision makers and to the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) beginning in the 1980s and also
throughout the 1990s (Kelman 1995). Other examples of unofficial peace
efforts that were facilitated by international third parties during these years
include an American Psychiatric Association initiative in the early and
mid-1980s, and meetings organized by Everett Mendelssohn of Harvard
University toward the end of the 1980s, sponsored by the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences.
In the 1990s, unofficial peace efforts gained further momentum and
peaked with the signing of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accord (known as the
Declaration of Principles). The Oslo process began in the form of unofficial
meetings between Israeli academics and PLO affiliates sponsored by
Norway (Abbas 1995; Savir 1998; Beilin 1999). The transformation of the
unofficial process into an official peace agreement was considered a major
achievement for unofficial peace efforts around the world. The Oslo peace
process also resulted in the proliferation of many unofficial peace efforts
between 1993 and 2000. After the failure of the final status talks and the
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outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, track two initiatives continued, but
their number has dropped. Still, some important unofficial efforts were
carried out during the period following the second Intifada to reactivate
negotiations between the parties, such as the Geneva Initiative (see Beilin
2004) and the People’s Voice Initiative (explained below).
During this time of violence, it became especially challenging to con-
tinue grassroots-level activities. Indeed, some observers have charged that
the Oslo process was too focused on secrecy and on back channel talks to
address peacebuilding barriers at the elite level and not focused enough on
mobilizing the grassroots in support of the peace process (Maney et al.
2006; Lieberfeld 2008; Wanis-St. John 2010). Recently, scholarly research has
also argued that a lack of civil society or grassroots involvement in a peace
process makes it harder to achieve a sustainable peace (Wanis-St. John and
Kew 2008). This argument, however, calls for further analysis in the Israeli–
Palestinian context. As we discuss in the results section of this article,
grassroots initiatives were also widespread after 1993, although they
occurred less frequently than elite-to-elite track two initiatives.
Despite their widespread application and the considerable funding
that they have attracted, academic studies of track two initiatives, especially
of a comparative nature, have been somewhat rare. One notable exception
is a study by Fisher (2005), who used a structured focused method to
compare nine cases of violent and protracted social conflicts in which
interactive conflict resolution (ICR) was used. Focusing specifically on the
ways that ICR outcomes were disseminated to external participants and
processes, he has demonstrated that such efforts often have a positive
impact on the overall peacebuilding effort. (Other examples of studies that
have studied track two impacts on official negotiations more systematically
include Kelman 1995; Rouhana 1995; Agha et al. 2003; Lieberfeld 2005;
Kaufman, Salem, and Verhoeven 2006; Dassa Kaye 2007; Çuhadar 2009;
Wanis-St. John 2010; and Schiff 2010).
Of these assessments, several (Kelman 1995; Rouhana 1995; Agha et al.
2003; Dassa Kaye 2007; Çuhadar 2009; Schiff 2010) focused specifically on
the use of track two diplomacy in the Israeli–Palestinian context. Some of
these studies suggested that Palestinian–Israeli track two initiatives have
achieved some transmission to the official process, although mostly in the
form of contributing to the process rather than to the outcome (e.g.,
Kelman 1995; Agha et al. 2003; Çuhadar 2009). Some of this work also
elaborated on the barriers to effective transmission, such as asymmetry
(Rouhana 1995; Çuhadar 2009).
The majority of existing studies that have examined track two efforts,
however, are descriptive in nature and focus on only one initiative or one
conflict rather than examining them comparatively. Our main motive with
this research has been to understand and to look critically and compara-
tively at the modus operandi of peace practitioners in this conflict: how
160 Çuhadar and Dayton Oslo and Its Aftermath
practitioners have envisaged social change in this conflict and what they
undertook to realize such social and political change. How do they differ
from each other in terms of approaches to track two practice in the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict? In sum, our intention was to understand the
“theories of conflict transformation” used by the peace practitioners in
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, as well as to comprehend how and why they
adopted these theories of conflict transformation.
Theories of Conflict Transformation
Prior to initiating any track two project, practitioners need to develop a
conceptual understanding of where the conflict “comes from,” what factors
keep it from being resolved, and what kind of programmatic interventions
are likely to transform the conflict in different ways. These assumptions are
called “theories of change,” and are “the causal processes through which
change comes about as a result of a program’s strategies and action”
(Shapiro 2005: 1).
Theories of change used in conflict resolution initiatives in general, and
track two diplomacy in particular, are focused on how change occurs
within individuals and groups as a result of intergroup interaction. We refer
to the particular theories of change used in conflict resolution and peace-
building practice as “theories of conflict transformation.” For instance, a
project that brings together Israeli and Palestinian school teachers to look
at the narratives of conflict taught in secondary school settings would need
to include a theory of change about how that discussion would enlighten
and transform those individuals, and how they could then become agents of
change, spreading the impacts of the initiative beyond the original group
that was convened. To date, research into the theories of change that guide
track two activities has been very limited (for an exception, see Anderson
and Olson 2003).
Research Methodology
In this project, we elicited directly from practitioners their theories of
conflict transformation. Our research proceeded in five phases. In Phase
One, we completed background research on people and organizations
involved in track two work between Israelis and Palestinians from the early
1990s and 2004. We then categorized and mapped each initiative that we
studied onto a 1990–2004 time line that included the pre-Oslo, interim, and
post-Oslo periods. We then shared these lists with the pioneers of track two
diplomacy in the region to check for accuracy and to complete any missing
information. These initiatives were then coded according to year, outcome
or relationship focus, and type of participant.
In the second phase of the project, we designed an interview protocol
to elicit from organizers of track two initiatives their assessments of the
roots of the conflict, the corresponding goals of their work, and the
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pathways by which they sought to disseminate impacts from the micro- to
macrolevel. Next, we conducted nineteen face-to-face in-depth interviews
with practitioners involved in track two initiatives using this protocol.
These interviews were followed by two workshops that brought together
additional track two practitioners to further discuss the theories of change
behind their work; one was held in Istanbul and the other in Washington,
DC. The Istanbul workshop was held with ten practitioners working at the
grassroots level, whereas the Washington workshop was held with ten
practitioners working at the academic/elite level.
All the individual interviews and the records of the focus group meet-
ings were transcribed verbatim. They were then coded using the NVivo
qualitative data analysis software (QSR International, Cambridge, MA) for
the following main categories: what practitioners think is the heart of
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; their beliefs about what went wrong in the
peace process; their beliefs about what track two should address and the
most appropriate type of intervention; the types of activities designed;goals
of the activities (outcome, relationship, or both); expected outcomes from
their initiatives; and what dissemination strategies were used, if any. The
results are reported in this article along these main categories as well. The
main categories for coding were determined by the research team with a
theory of change assessment logic in mind. The categories were organized
following the interview questionnaire. The interview questionnaire can be
found in Appendix One. Within each category, answers were coded follow-
ing the rules of grounded theory approach in which each emerging sub-
category was coded inductively.2
Results
We first present the general findings from Phase One of the project in
which we compiled a list of initiatives and coded them for their goal, type
of participants, conflict stage, and duration. The following tables indicate
the diversity of track two work conducted between Israelis and Palestinians
between 1992 and 2004.3
Figure One below shows that of the seventy-nine initiatives we iden-
tified, most occurred during the interim period. Although the number of
initiatives declined considerably in the post-Intifada period, contrary to the
common wisdom they have not come to termination completely. Figure
One further breaks down these initiatives according to their goals: whether
they were outcome oriented or relationship oriented (see above discus-
sion). It shows that overall, across the entire time frame of the study, the
number of outcome-oriented and relationship-oriented initiatives were
about the same. The number of outcome-oriented initiatives, however, did
decline significantly between the interim and post-Intifada periods,whereas
the number of process-oriented initiatives did not change much across
different time periods.
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Figure Two shows the seventy-nine initiatives by periods again,but this
time with a focus on the type of participants. It indicates that most of the
initiatives during the pre-Oslo and interim periods were held with elites (i.e.,
academics, professionals, policy makers, e.g., track one and a half). The
number of grassroots-level initiatives increased during the interim period,and
— surprisingly — slightly increased in number in the post-Intifada period
despite the breakdown in negotiations and the violence on the ground.
Figure One
Distribution of Track Two Initiatives by Historic Periods
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Interestingly, some of the elite-focused initiatives adopted a grassroots
approach either simultaneously or as a replacement strategy during this
period. One such example is the People’s Voice initiative founded by Ami
Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh, which hoped to garner widespread support for
a two-state solution. This trend can be explained by the failure of the official
negotiations and back channel talks that dominated the interim period.
Figures One and Two indicate that while the official negotiations were
continuing during the interim period, most of the track two initiatives were
focused on official negotiations, were held with elites/professionals, and
were more outcome oriented. As the negotiations broke down, however,
some practitioners shifted their strategy toward a more grassroots-level
mobilization.
All in all, we can say that more track two initiatives were undertaken
with elite/professional participants than with representatives of the grass-
roots. This is not surprising given that many of the track two initiatives in
the Israeli–Palestinian context were undertaken in preparation for the final
status negotiations.One interesting finding from these data is that there was
a slight increase in the number of grassroots-level initiatives after the
collapse of peace negotiations, while in the time period that included the
Oslo talks and the final status negotiations, we found a greater incidence of
elite-oriented and outcome-focused initiatives.
Finally, Table One (above) breaks all of the initiatives down according
to type of participants and goal. The overall picture shows that most of the
process-oriented workshops were held with grassroots people such as
youth, whereas most of the outcome-oriented initiatives were held with
elite/professional-level participants such as academics and policy makers.
Initiatives that are geared toward achieving an outcome for peace negotia-
tions or that focus on a specific joint product (such as the formation of a
water master plan) were carried out with professional and elite people. The
other combinations are rare, especially outcome-oriented initiatives held
with grassroots-level people.
In the second phase of the project, we tried to understand the ratio-
nale behind these major trends in the Israeli–Palestinian track two prac-
tices. Most of the practitioners (thirty-five people out of thirty-nine) we
Table One
Distribution of Israeli–Palestinian Track Two Initiatives by Goals
1990–2004 (n = 79)
Relationship Oriented Outcome Oriented
Grassroots 27 (34%) 1 (1.26%)
Elite/professional 13 (16.4%) 38 (48%)
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interviewed emphasized subjective or psychological factors at the heart of
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The factors cited include such psychological
dynamics of intergroup conflicts as prejudice, stereotypes, enemy images,
dehumanization, distrust, existential fears, as well as humiliation and honor,
chosen traumas, and taboos.
After the psychological factors, the second and third most
frequently mentioned sources of the conflict cited by our study parti-
cipants were:
• religious and cultural differences (eleven people);
• power asymmetry and the impact of being “occupied” (eight people);
• access to resources and their control (seven);
• “realpolitik,” referring to power politics in the region and between
global actors (three people);
• the “other side” (e.g., the behavior of the enemy) (two people); and
• inflammatory media (one person).
Few of the practitioners interviewed suggested that the “other side”
is the source of the conflict. Therefore, we conclude that practitioners
attribute the conflict to several different social, economic, political,
and psychological factors rather than to the inherent characteristics
of the “enemy.” This more nuanced assessment of the basis of the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict contradicts “attribution theory,” which posits
that individuals and social groups tend to attribute their own group’s
negative behaviors to external factors, while the negative behavior
of out-groups is viewed as being a product of internal charac-
teristics, such as poor moral character (Kelley 1973). This finding is
not surprising given that the practitioners we interviewed are schooled
in conflict resolution theory and methods, and thus more likely to see
the basis of social conflict from a more conceptually complex point of
view.
We also observed that structural sources of the conflict, such as
resource and power asymmetry and the impact of the Israeli occupation
of the West Bank, were mostly brought up by, and thus were more
salient for, the Palestinian practitioners who were interviewed. Only a few
Israeli or American practitioners mentioned resource and power asymme-
try as the major source of the conflict, and those who mentioned it were
mostly practitioners who carried out activities specifically concerning
environment, resources, and security. Furthermore, local (those living in
the region) practitioners (especially Palestinian) were more likely to
report that resource and power asymmetry and issues related to the
occupation are important sources of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict than
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were the American practitioners who did not mention them as being
significant.
Although some practitioners reported that resource/power asymme-
try and the impact of the occupation are critically important sources of
the conflict, they still choose to exclusively address psychological factors
in their activities. For instance, one practitioner who stressed the essential
importance of the Israeli occupation as the driver of the conflict was,
nevertheless, involved in a project that targeted psychological dynamics,
such as dehumanization and prejudice. The practitioners’ activities may
be disconnected from their beliefs, and they may fail to address “struc-
tural” aspects of the conflict in their track two work for several structural
reasons. First, funding may be easier to obtain in a certain domain of
peacebuilding — the practice is often donor driven (Hanafi and Tabar
2005; Çuhadar and Hanafi 2009). In addition, different NGOs specialize in
different services and activities — the organization’s practices will
support its mission, even if individual practitioners may have contradic-
tory opinions. Finally, because track two is an unofficial process, practi-
tioners who engage in these efforts will have limited ability to address
the structural dimensions of conflict.
Nonetheless, some practitioners, especially NGOs that work in both
the environment and the peace domains, choose to address both types of
root causes successfully. For instance, one initiative that we studied pro-
vided water services to residents of an impoverished area, and at the same
time turned this development project into an intergroup contact activity in
which Israeli and Palestinian villagers had the chance to work together in
a joint cooperative effort.
Religious and cultural differences were the second most mentioned
source of the conflict by Israeli, Palestinian, and American practitioners.
Specifically mentioned were irreconcilable religious beliefs, such as the
notion of a “promised land,” beliefs held about the religious significance of
Jerusalem on both sides, and attitudes of dishonor and disrespect for each
other’s values. Most of the time, these sources of conflict were mentioned
together with psychological factors rather than by themselves, and some
initiatives appeared to seek to target both kinds of conflict sources. For
example, a project carried out among religious leaders to discuss Jerusalem
addressed religious, psychological, and political concerns. Another project
focused on the history of Muslim Spain, a civilization in which peaceful
coexistence among Muslims, Jews, and Christians lasted several hundred
years.
Finally, although few practitioners cited “realpolitik” as an issue at the
heart of the conflict, some felt strongly that Machiavellian political dynam-
ics, such as the activities of international powers, was an important com-
ponent of any analysis of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Realpolitik was
mentioned exclusively by Palestinian practitioners.
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Type of Activities and Theories of Conflict Transformation
Differentiating among the range of practices in the Israeli–Palestinian
context and organizing those practices into strict categories proved to be
a challenge. Although in the narratives told to us by the practitioners,
theories were clearly distinguishable, their actual practice seemed often
to represent a blend of several theories. In our research, however, we
identified four different, although interrelated, types of track two practice
at work in these organizations. Our findings reveal information about
which activities are usually preferred and which theories of conflict trans-
formation are adopted in light of these activities. Although we found over-
laps between each type, and also found that sometimes practitioners use
several of them in combination simultaneously or contemporaneously, we
believe these trends can be distinguished — at least at a theoretical level.
Below, we refer to types of practice that are shared by several of the
peace practitioners. We labeled these four categories as the “psychologi-
cal,” the “constructivist,”“the “capacity building,” and the “realistic interest”
approaches.
The “Psychological” Approach. This approach sees psychological
factors as the most important causes of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
The activities organized in this tradition of practice usually have such end
goals as overcoming negative stereotypes and images toward the other
disputants, rehumanizing the other, eliminating intergroup prejudice, and
building trust and empathy between the adversaries. The theory of con-
flict transformation articulated in this discourse relies on psychological
processes related to cognitive, affective, and behavioral change. The pre-
ferred method is social contact that brings together the representatives of
adversarial groups in an interactive and friendly environment in order to
change the way that each side thinks about, feels toward, and acts toward
the other side. The social contact, according to this theory, will trigger a
cognitive and affective change process in individuals, and will result in the
replacement of negative attitudes, feelings, and zero-sum understanding of
the conflict. These new understandings will then, according to this
theory, influence public opinion or be considered by people when they
make decisions. For example, one practitioner described a program that
brought Israeli and Palestinian teachers together to address enemy images
and negative stereotypes in order to improve relations between the indi-
viduals from adversarial societies.“Teachers get a better knowledge about
the history and politics and [each other’s] communities,” she told us.
“When teachers from both sides get together and meet together they will
know more about the other side from the emotional, personal, and pro-
fessional level.” The social contact between teachers from adversarial
parties changes how they see and feel about each other individually. The
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rationale for focusing on teachers is their eventual impact on a much
larger group of people, their students.
Social contact has long been used to decrease intergroup bias and
prejudice (Pettigrew 1998). In the context of track two diplomacy, this
approach is used as a mechanism to resolve or transform the conflict as
well. A vast amount of social psychology literature describes the conse-
quences and conditions of social contact. We observed, however, that
despite this literature, some of the practitioners did not elaborate how
and why the contact activity would result in the positive individual
change. Contact — that is,“when they get together and meet together” —
is seen as the tool for change, but the psychological processes that are
triggered by contact are not necessarily something of which the practi-
tioners in our study were aware.
The “Constructivist” Approach. The constructivist approach focuses
on the conflicting and competing historical conflict narratives that lie at
the heart of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. These practitioners work with
conflict narratives in order to reframe the stakeholders’ zero-sum views of
the conflict into narratives that allow for mutual accommodation, com-
promise, and cooperation.
Activities to transform conflict narratives sometimes take place
within joint groups of Israelis and Palestinians, other times new conflict
narratives are produced by a group of scholars and then disseminated
through media. The goal is often to get individuals to rethink their exist-
ing views of the conflict and the other side either by challenging their
existing beliefs or by showing them that an alternative and more con-
structive narrative is legitimate. An example of an activity based on this
approach is the formation of an international news service to distribute
newspaper articles that emphasize constructive ways of managing the
conflict or that describe ways to resolve it. These articles are selected and
then distributed in several languages to a wide range of readers. Thus, the
service provides a constructive alternative to the mainstream nationalistic
discourse of the two sides. In a similar vein, another project brings
together historians to rewrite a common historical narrative about the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict that focuses on human security aspects.
Here again, however, practitioners faced difficulties when pressed to
explain the actual causal mechanisms that would catalyze the changes
they seek. For instance, practitioners operating from the constructivist
perspective could not explain what kind of cognitive change is envi-
sioned or how it will be realized, under what conditions individuals
change their existing beliefs, or how cognitions about the conflict are
defended or abandoned when contradicting pieces of information are
presented.
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The “Capacity Builder” Approach. The capacity-building approach
addresses the lack of conflict management skills and knowledge about the
other side among Israelis and Palestinians. By extension, the capacity
builder views education and training as the main tools for conflict
de-escalation,and the acquisition of nonviolent conflict resolution skills as
the remedy to violent destructive conflict. Trainings are conducted in
various areas, such as problem solving, negotiation and mediation skills,
and peace education. These trainings often touch upon topics related to
human rights, diversity, citizenship, and peacebuilding. The idea behind
these activities is that people who acquire such skills will make more
informed and nonviolent decisions regarding conflict management. Simi-
larly, peace education projects seek to prepare educational curricula
devoid of prejudice and negative images. Often, the teachers of both
parties are brought together for the joint preparation of new curricula
and/or to be trained in how to use them.
The theory of change in these types of activities usually relies on the
empowerment of individuals (especially of youth) through equipping
them with skills and knowledge. In addition to empowerment, attitude
change is another frequently mentioned end goal in these types of initia-
tives. In either case, skills training and education are expected to enhance
the capacity of individuals in both societies to undertake peaceful
change. As such, the capacity builder is seeking to create “change agents”
within each community.
An example of a project that adopts this approach is a special
program that educates Jewish youth in the fifth and sixth grades in Arabic
language and culture. Instruction is provided by Palestinian teachers. In
addition to experiencing the curriculum, Israeli and Palestinian students
also interact through various social activities at which Arabic language is
practiced. By participating in this program, Jewish students have the
opportunity to be in contact with the “other” while also developing new
language skills. Therefore, the project claims to contribute to the peaceful
coexistence of members of the two cultures, and thus equips and empow-
ers young people with new skills and knowledge. The project specifically
targets fifth and sixth graders because they are believed to respond more
positively to new information and are seen as having the capacity to
transform.
The “Realistic Interest”Approach. This approach often deals with the
“realistic interest” aspects of the conflict, such as resource conflicts and
negotiable interests. The approach is somewhat reminiscent of Muzafer
Sherif’s (1966) realistic group conflict theory, which focuses on the real-
istic interests at the heart of the conflict and the superordinate goals that
can facilitate cooperation between conflicting groups.
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The types of activities that fall under this approach include “func-
tionalist” track two activities that use tangible development challenges to
bring each side together to solve a joint problem. Typical projects focus
on environmental or agricultural issues, health care, or urban planning
challenges. Many have focused on technical cooperation to better manage
water resources in the region. Practitioners hope that by solving a joint
problem together, participants will develop a degree of trust and under-
standing that contributes to peacebuilding. For example, one of the prac-
titioners told us,“I got this idea that environment can serve as a bridge
and working on environmental ideas together can help two communities
work together and rather than just talking about relations, they will have
a common goal.”
Such activities usually have two goals:one goal often targets technical
or functional cooperation, another goal targets relationships between the
parties. For instance, an NGO educates youth groups in each community
about the water situation in their community and the neighbor’s commu-
nity. In another program, people from neighboring adversarial communi-
ties are brought together to work on joint development projects that
could improve the water situation in each community. In both cases, the
professional and technical backgrounds of participants are used as start-
ing points. Many claim that water is the ultimate peace building resource
because it is relevant to the daily lives of people, it can attract the interest
of professionals who are concerned with the environment, and it is
related to the conflict at the micro- and macrolevel.“Water can be a bridge
in dialogue instead of reason for conflict,” said one of the practitioners. As
it is a major issue in the conflict, it has to be discussed together. It can be
a base for regional cooperation.”
Another practitioner adds:“Each side is affected by the behavior of
the other. [They need] clean water in sufficient quantities. . . . Practically,
if people learn to save water they understand that there can be enough
for everyone, and there will be enough for everybody. . . . The project
enables each side to express their needs and concerns and helps them to
develop an understanding of their interests and the common interests.”
Dissemination Strategies
Another goal of our study has been to identify the strategies that track two
practitioners use to transmit the outputs of their conflict transformation
work beyond the participants of the particular initiative (Fisher 2005). In
this article, the conduits for the transmission of track two products and
insights are called “dissemination strategies,” although different terms have
been used in the literature by other scholars referring to the same phe-
nomenon, for example,“transfer strategies”(Fisher 1997;Çuhadar 2009) and
“crucial juncture” (Volkan, Julius, and Montville 1991). Of special interest to
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us was whether the practitioners have developed strategies to make an
impact at the macrolevel or not, and what common strategies, if any, were
selected by the advocates of certain “theories of change.”
In general, our findings about dissemination strategies fall into the
“insider”and“outsider”categories suggested by Mari Fitzduff and Cheyanne
Church (2004). Insider strategies include working with elite “insiders” who
are close to decision makers and negotiators, such as experts and advisors.
Outsider strategies seek to influence decision makers through a bottom-up
approach, such as influencing public opinion by mobilizing peace cam-
paigns. As we noted earlier, such bottom-up approaches have been some-
what neglected in the literature on track two diplomacy, although a number
of recent works have focused on the role that NGOs and other actors have
played in organizing grassroots efforts to advance peace (Goodhand 2006;
Kaufman, Salem, and Verhoeven 2006; Aall 2007; Wanis-St. John and Kew
2008).
Insider Strategies. During our interviews and focus group work-
shops with practitioners, we identified five insider strategies being
employed by practitioners: sending artifacts (e.g., recommendations, infor-
mation) to the decision makers, selecting the “right” participants (i.e.,
influential, representative, skilled), involving international participants and
third parties for leverage purposes, establishing a functional role for the
group (e.g., epistemic, policy advisory, etc.), and lobbying and advocacy.
Of these, the selection of the“right”participants was clearly the preferred
insider strategy used by most practitioners. Indeed, the selection of par-
ticipants appeared to be one of the most organized aspects of most track
two initiatives. Oftentimes, the right people were a mixed group of
politically influential people and experts/academics.
Some practitioners, especially those working in highly institutional-
ized NGOs, took further steps beyond merely selecting the “right people”
to increase the likelihood that their project would have macro- as well as
microimpacts. Some, for instance, considered how their initiative could
augment the lobbying and advocacy process within government. Others
sought to organize meetings with decision makers after the initiative
concluded in order to communicate the results of their track two activity.
One Israeli NGO, which had organized a dialogue on the future of Jerusa-
lem, even sought to have an impact on the negotiation process at Camp
David by contacting and lobbying the American mediators, and transmit-
ting information and insights to the American mediation team before and
during the negotiations. Some of these ideas were actually tested at the
negotiation table by the mediators.
Interestingly, however, most of the practitioners interviewed for this
project had only vague notions of how these elite participants could
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actually become change agents in their communities. Moreover, most
practitioners showed little interest in developing a greater understanding
of how political processes at the official level work so that they could
develop transmission strategies that would support political change at the
official level.
To what extent insider strategies have successfully disseminated the
effects and outcomes of track two initiatives remains a major question
facing practitioners. Findings from our interviews and workshops suggest
that the track two community subscribes to a set of theoretical proposi-
tions about the conditions and contexts that facilitate the dissemination
of track two insights and ideas to the political process, but these propo-
sitions have yet to be tested or confirmed as valid. For example, while one
practitioner suggested that including only elite-level participants is the
most effective transmission strategy, another argued that working specifi-
cally with technical experts who have political connections is the best
means to increase the likelihood of dissemination. Still another practitio-
ner argued that including journalists in track two projects is the most
effective mechanisms for dissemination.
Çuhadar (2009) previously discussed the effectiveness of some of the
insider strategies listed above in terms of their impact on the Israeli–
Palestinian negotiations. That study found that for successful transmission
to occur in a way that affects the outcome of a decision-making process,
an effective dissemination strategy (i.e., symmetrical transfer of ideas and
participants in addition to contacts and communication with the nego-
tiators) must be accompanied by openness to outside information by the
official negotiating team and leadership. Thus, conducting track two ini-
tiatives with influential people was not an adequate strategy by itself — to
be effective, additional actions were needed from both practitioners and
participants. These included visiting official mediators, working closely
with particular official negotiators, or arranging to have track two practi-
tioners present at official negotiations, oftentimes as advisors.
Among the five transmission mechanisms listed earlier, contacting
the official mediators and negotiators and exporting key people from
track two initiatives to participate in formal negotiations provided the
most direct access to the process and seemed most effective at facilitating
direct input into the official negotiation process.
Outsider Strategies. Outsider strategies focus on disseminating the
results of track two initiatives to a broader public in order to make an
impact at the macrolevel. This strategy includes using the media to report
about the outcomes of the initiative, organizing public peace campaigns,
publicizing alternative narratives about the conflict, and utilizing public
opinion polls to influence the behavior of the masses. Initiatives relying
172 Çuhadar and Dayton Oslo and Its Aftermath
on outsider strategies are more commonly undertaken by practitioners
who work with participants either from the grassroots level or from the
media sector. These approaches seek to build mass support for the peace
process or to move the stalled peace process forward by illustrating what
is possible through unofficial diplomacy. Practitioners using these tactics
often resort to powerful symbols and credible community leaders in the
society to augment the impact of their work.
One of our important findings regarding transmission strategies is
that most of the outcome-oriented initiatives preferred to use “insider”
strategies to effect change, especially during the pre-Oslo and interim
periods of the conflict. Interestingly, however, we observed a reduction in
the use of insider strategies and an increase in the use of outsider strat-
egies after the collapse of the final status negotiations. A prominent
example of such a shift is the Geneva Initiative. While the NGO respon-
sible for the Geneva Initiative preferred insider strategies during the
interim period, it later shifted to an outsider strategy, concentrating spe-
cifically on strategies to build public support for the plan even in the
absence of official support.
Another important finding is that most practitioners involved in
relationship-oriented grassroots initiatives did not seem to have
developed outreach strategies to support their work, unlike practi-
tioners associated with outcome-oriented and elite-level initiatives. In
relationship-oriented grassroots-level initiatives, the end goal was often
stated as improving the relations among the participants in the activity.
But even when these practitioners stated that their projects had the
ultimate goal of contributing to peace at large, they still were unable to
articulate how changes at the microlevel that came as a result of their
work would affect the macrolevel. We should note that a few of the
initiatives that we examined did have a clearly articulated strategy for
meso-level change. For instance, a practitioner involved in an educational
project undertaken with teachers stated that spreading the impact of that
initiative from teachers to students through curriculum reform was one of
that project’s goals.
Another important finding of our study is related to “lateral transmis-
sion,”that is, the transmission of the effects and outcomes of the initiatives
to other peace practitioners and initiatives. Only a handful of the practi-
tioners we interviewed stated that they had attempted this lateral dissemi-
nation. In cases in which lateral transmission was attempted, the goal was
typically to generate collaboration among peace practitioners in order to
increase peer-to-peer support. But the “big picture” results from the inter-
views that we conducted suggest that practitioners of track two diplo-
macy rarely tried to synchronize or sequence their work with each other,
preferring individual over collective efforts. Indeed, some practitioners
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reported that competition for donor funds provided a negative incentive
structure for collaboration.
Finally, nearly half of the practitioners we interviewed expressed
concern about how to overcome the “usual suspects” problem — that is,
how to involve new types of political actors in track two efforts in order
to expand the number and types of people engaged in this work. Some
participants noted that track two work in the region typically involves the
same set of people, most of whom are already predisposed toward bilat-
eral peacebuilding efforts. Several practitioners said that if track two was
to have a wider impact on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, organizers
would need to find ways to involve more politically extreme representa-
tives of each society and/or to reach out to new and emerging political
actors on both sides of the conflict.
Conclusion
We believe that researchers who study track two diplomacy, as well as
practitioners who engage in it, would benefit from examining track two
efforts in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict over the past two decades, and this
article represents a modest beginning in that direction. Our research shows
that track two efforts express a variety of:
• alternative conceptualizations of the nature of the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict;
• beliefs about what kind of projects will lead to its transformation; and
• views about how track two initiatives can be transmitted from the
micro- to the macrolevel.
We have also identified a number of trends in track two work between
Israelis and Palestinians, among them:
• Israeli–Palestinian“people-to-people” track two initiatives have gradually
replaced senior-level track two exchanges over the past fifteen years.
• The track two community subscribes to a set of theoretical propositions
about the conditions and contexts that facilitate the transmission of
track two insights and ideas to the political process, but these proposi-
tions have yet to be validated.
• Track two specialists do little strategic planning about ways to most
effectively disseminate track two insights and ideas to the political
process, and rarely try to synchronize or sequence their work within
their own community.
• And track two practitioners have faced difficulties in enlarging their
circle of influence beyond the “usual suspects.”
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Future research could test the four approaches to conflict transforma-
tion identified in this research report to determine whether these
approaches are also found in the work of other practitioners in different
regions of the world. If they are, measurement categories and methods of
data collection could be developed for each approach, making possible a
more robust assessment of the impacts of track two initiatives across
different contexts and regions.
At the applied level, our research contains four recommendations for
more effective practice. First, practitioners should more consciously map
out the theory of change behind their work prior to its implementation.
Such efforts would improve the connection among program goals, program
activities, and program dissemination. Second, the impacts of track two
activities will likely be increased if practitioners and participants spend
some of their time developing more targeted and effective strategies for
dissemination of project outcomes to both the track one community and to
the broader public. This could begin by learning more about the conduits
through which official decision making occurs but also include the devel-
opment of new strategies, such as the use of social media campaigns to
drive political change. Third, the four practice approaches reviewed above
are distinct avenues for conflict transformation that, if combined within a
single project, might increase overall peacebuilding impacts. Some practi-
tioners are already doing this, while others may find our categorization
beneficial to developing a more holistic set of project activities that jointly
target the emotional, cognitive, structural, and functional bases of social and
political conflicts.
Finally, our findings indicate that track two initiatives are often “silos”
of activity, with practitioners and participants only vaguely aware of other
projects being conducted concurrently. We would recommend that con-
nections among initiatives be established so that track two efforts are more
effectively combined and sequenced to increase impacts. For instance, track
two projects designed to create cross-communal interdependency within a
particular industry (such as olive oil production) might have a greater
impact if they are done in tandem with other initiatives taking place in
other sectors (such as the protection of watersheds). This final recommen-
dation is directed primarily to those funding track two work.
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1. Various terms are used to refer to problem-solving workshops held interactively, for
example, interactive conflict resolution (Fisher 1997; Rouhana 2000); interactive problem solving
(Kelman 1995); sustained dialogue (Saunders 1999; Voorhees 2002); unofficial diplomacy (Volkan,
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Julius, and Montville 1991); multitrack diplomacy (Diamond and McDonald 1996); and track one
and a half (Nan 2005). Although they are each different in their methodological and philosophical
approach to dialogue and the end goal they formulate for their practice, in this research and article,
we include all of these terms that refer to a similar type of peacebuilding activity based on social
contact between the adversaries often facilitated by a neutral third party. Therefore, we use the
term “track two diplomacy” throughout this article as a generic shortcut to refer to all of such
contact-based interactive activities.
2. All interview and meeting quotes are reported anonymously in this article. Transcripts of
the interviews and the meetings are held by the researchers. Please contact the authors for further
inquiry and information.
3. At this point, the reader should keep in mind that the data listed here exclude the work
done within Israel among Arabs and Jews (e.g., Abraham Fund), and only cover initiatives between
Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories.
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Appendix One:
Questionnaire Used during the Interviews
Interview Protocol for Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track
Two Diplomacy
Instructions to participants. This interview protocol has been developed for use with the project
Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy. The goal of this project is
to investigate the basic ideas that guided the work of track two practitioners seeking to transform
the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, particularly ideas related to the transfer of insights and ideas from
the initiative to individuals and institutions outside of it.
Interview Questions
Clearly identify the specific initiative being discussed by name, duration, and other relevant
descriptors prior to asking the following questions.
1. Theory of Change
• When you got involved with this initiative, how did you understand the nature of the conflict
(causes, sources of intractability, important milestones)?
• What was the initiative trying to accomplish? What were its goals?
 Process or outcome changes?
 Cognitive, emotional, or structural changes?
 Scope of change: individual, interpersonal, intergroup, societal, global
 Short-term/long-term changes
• How was the initiative planned so that it could achieve these changes?
 Design and sequencing of activities
 Assumptions made about pathways and obstacles to change
 Selection of participants
 Duration
 Role of facilitator(s)
2. Transfer Dynamics
• Were plans made to transfer the accomplishments (achievements) of the initiative (project)
beyond the immediate participants? If yes, what kinds of strategies/methods were used? If not,
why not? (see attached list of transfer strategies as a guide)?
 Upward impact strategies (decision makers)
 Downward impact strategies (community institutions and representatives)
 Lateral impact strategies (coordination with other track II initiatives, sequencing, network
building, etc.)
• Did these strategies/methods change over the course of the initiative? If so, how?
• Do you think these strategies worked? That is, do you think the initiative ended up
having an impact on people, institutions, and political processes outside of it? If yes,
how?
 Lessons (insights)
 Information, ideas, knowledge
 Proposals
• What factors inhibited these impacts from occurring?
• Did any unanticipated impacts result from the project?
3. Impact Assessment
• In general, how do you know if you’ve been successful with this type of initiative?
• What methods/measures were in place to monitor the impacts and effects of the initiative?
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• In retrospect, what tools/methods might have been more appropriate for assessing project
impacts?
• Based on your experience, what do you think worked and did not work? What would you do
differently?
*Transfer Strategies
• Send artifacts (consensus-based recommendations, technical information, etc.)
• Select the “right” participants (influential participants, representative participants, skilled
participants, etc.)
• Perform outreach to key decision makers, community leaders, other track II organizers, etc.,
about the initiative
• Conduct a media campaign
• Involve international participants for leverage purposes
• Pursue insider strategies
• Pursue outsider strategies
• Facilitate the continuation of the dialogue in a new form once the initiative is concluded
• Establish functional role for group (epistemic, policy advisory, etc.)
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